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Abstract
In many countries, pension funds based on individual accounts have been affected
by high operating costs. Contract theory helps to unravel the nature of such problems:
managers of pension funds have strong incentives to manipulate market expectations
about their capacity through wasteful activities (e.g. promotion). Thus, competi-
tion among pension funds entails efficiency losses, due to pension savings attraction
efforts, as well as gains, related to investments in asset management skills. Regula-
tions capping fees or costs of pension funds worsen market inefficiency, while a public
pension fund competing with private ones improves (at least weakly) it. Taking into
account political and commitment constraints affecting public institutions, a quasi-
competitive pension scheme - centralizing contribution collection, auctioning the right
to manage raised money to competitive fund managers, and affording an opting out
choice to households - Pareto-dominates (at least weakly) the market of pension funds.
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1 Introduction
Several countries passed or are currently implementing reforms of their pension systems
involving a partial switch from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to fully funded (FF) plans, e.g
Feldstein (2005b). The celebrated report Averting Old Age Crisis (The World Bank,
1994) has mustered consensus on the view that old-age retirement schemes should be
multi-pillar1: a mandatory PAYG scheme providing basic pensions; a mandatory FF
scheme supplementing them; and possible voluntary savings.
The main argument in favor of a mixed scheme and of the introduction or strengthen-
ing of FF pension plans is related to the financial crisis of PAYG systems determined by
adverse demographic trends, namely to the opportunity of tax-smoothing policies through
capital accumulation or pre-funding (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002)2. The mainstream
approach to pension reform is to create (or strengthen) a financial sector characterized by
special operators (the pension funds) and regulated by governmental authorities. Individu-
als choose pension funds to manage their individual accounts and, with certain limitations,
asset allocation policy. In the conventional wisdom, competition among pension funds in-
sures the efficient allocation of private (pension) savings and widens individual opportunity
to choose preferred risk-return bundles.
Though FF plans based on individual accounts are gathering momentum in many
countries, in the traditional institutional framework of the US and of the UK the typical
form of FF pensions used to be the defined benefit (DB) company-sponsored plan (Davis,
1995): companies define workers’ pension rights and commit to finance them. Plans based
on individual accounts are very often defined contribution (DC): individuals (mandatorily)
1Consensus on the World Bank’s approach is wide but far from being unanimous, e.g. Kotlikoff (1999).
Moreover, some relevant amendments to the multi-pillar approach are justified by the specific features of
involved countries: size, development stage, institutional efficiency (Srinivas et al., 2000).
2Pension rights are explicit contingent liabilities of the public sector (and/or private institutions) with
respect to households. The contingent nature of such liabilities tends to weaken aggregating across house-
holds, giving rise to a strong analogy with (public) debt (Sinn, 2000; Valde´s-Prieto, 2005). Thus, the
argument for pre-funding (within the pension system) follows by tax-burden smoothing considerations, as
for public debt management (Missale, 1999, ch. 2 and 3).
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contribute to pension funds that commit to pay annuities determined by the financial
returns on contributed capital3. The trend of the FF pension industry towards DC plans
based on individual accounts can be related to the structural change in the economic
systems, relying more and more on the mobility of workers among different firms and
regions4. DB company plans are affected by portability5 and under- funding6 problems.
Notwithstanding a spreading trend towards DC plans based on individual accounts,
these are not free from critiques:
”Individual accounts would unquestionably entail administrative costs not present un-
der traditional Social Security. [...] How high those costs would be in reality would
depend on a number of factors, including how centralized the system of accounts was
and how limited the investment choices were; the level of service provided [...]; the
size of the accounts; and the rules and regulations governing them. The higher the
administrative costs, the lower the ultimate benefit a worker would receive, all else
equal, since more of the funds in the accounts would be consumed by these costs, and
less would be left over to pay retirement benefits.”7
As other financial industries, pension funds are featured by moderate scale economies.
Moreover, a wide consensus identifies important components of high administrative costs
3At retirement age, payments of both DB and DC pension funds can take the form of capital (instead of
annuities), as well; however, the possibility to obtain capital payments instead of annuities is often limited
by law.
4Analyzing the trend in G10 countries, the (OECD, 2005b, p. 33) points out that a movement away
from DB plans is underway. However, some countries are opting for so called hybrid plans: DC plans with
a minimum warranted return, involving some DB feature.
5Say, limitations to full recognition of acquired pension rights among different DB plans, linked to
different technical and institutional problems. These limitations are easily overcome with DC plans based
on individual accounts while in DB company plans pension rights are bundled with other aspects of workers’
occupational treatment.
6Asset management of pension funds sponsored by companies is often used as a tool to manipulate
reported budgetary data of sponsors (Bergstresser and Rauh, 2004).
7Diamond and Orszag (2004, p. 47). Several contributions investigated this point, e.g. Diamond
(2000); Bateman and Mitchell (2004); Dobronogov and Murthi (2005); Mitchell (1996); Sunde´n (2004);
Whitehouse (2000). To illustrate, let us consider that all fees charged by pension funds are measured as
a share of managed assets. Assuming a 2% average real rate of return on pension assets, a growth of fees
from 0.2% to 0.6% (say, nearly the difference between default-public and market pension funds in Sweden
- (Sunde´n, 2004, p. 4)) reduces the net retirement yield rate of an individual (working for 45 years and
experiencing a 1% average real growth of her wage) by 0.4%, and her end-career pension savings by 8.6%.
Moreover, losses in terms of yield and savings raise as the rate of return on pension assets increases.
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of pension funds in promotion and marketing activities, as well as in switching costs, that
are absent in company pension funds or in PAYG systems (Bateman and Mitchell, 2004;
Dobronogov and Murthi, 2005). However, supporters of reforms introducing or widening
the role of DC plans based on individual accounts also stress that these costs do not usually
overweight efficiency benefits of pension plans based on individual accounts, e.g. Feldstein
(2005a)8.
Historical experience shows that the risk of high costs of DC pension plans as well as
the risk of underfunding of DB company plans are typically shared between pensioners
and the government (either in the form of bail-out of underfunded plans or in the form of
warranty of minimum returns to pensioners).
Different policies have been proposed to tackle scale-economies and lessen promotion
and switching costs. As first, regulations constraining the working of the market of pen-
sion funds have been suggested (James et al., 1999): centralization of contribution collec-
tion, limitation of fund manager services (and promotion), constraints to asset allocation
policies. These anticompetitive rules would reduce efficiency costs linked to competition
amongst fund managers; but, such benefit is balanced by a restriction in the choice free-
dom of individuals among different risk-return bundles9. More recently, some countries
have adopted (e.g. Sweden) or are considering (e.g. UK) the introduction of a public pen-
sion fund (aiming at increasing competitive pressure on and at providing an alternative to
private funds) featured by low fees, risks, and expected revenues (Sunde´n, 2004; Turner
et al., 2006).
The idea of a public pension fund is not new and, indeed, has also been proposed in
a relatively extreme version of full nationalization or centralization of the funded pillar,
in order to benefit of enhanced risk-pooling and low administrative costs of concentrated
8Admittedly, this has been a problem in Latin America experience and it is likely to suggest a more
cautious approach in transition and small economies, that are featured by limited and inefficient financial
markets and institutions (Cangiano et al., 1998; Schiff et al., 2000; Srinivas et al., 2000; Whitehouse, 2000).
9A rather limited sacrifice, in the real world: it is, indeed, questionable whether individuals are actually
able to choose their preferred risk-return bundle over a life-long time span (Diamond, 2004, 2005). Munnell
and Sunde´n (2002, 2004) provide evidence in this direction analyzing US individual retirement plans.
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schemes, e.g. Diamond (2000). The potential huge size of aggregate pension savings sug-
gests caution with respect to the risk of political interference in economy and financial
markets that such institutional solution would entail10. A problem that can be hardly
overcome by regulations, given that governments lack of effective commitment technolo-
gies to counter it (Besley and Prat, 2005). Moreover, restricting public fund manager’s
discretion, to hamper the risk of political interference, is likely to waste the gains of the
FF pillar, that are generated by efficient capital allocation.
The theory underlying these policies considers high costs as basically determined by
lack of competition, hence by the existence of barriers to entry in the market and, conse-
quently, of extra profits of pension funds. Unless further political constraints are consid-
ered, this view cannot explain the long run functioning of the market of pension funds.
Moreover, the experience of the last quarter of century has suggested the role of institu-
tional design in warranting the capacity of the FF pension schemes to deliver the good
they were conceived for, and in particular of governance and incentive problems (Besley
and Prat, 2005). In a broader perspective, the institutional settings adopted to carry out
services like pension provision involve specific choices, in terms of sharing of risks and
of regulation of incentives of involved players, that heavily affect the their performance
(Acemoglu et al., 2003; Prat, 2005).
Following this theoretical perspective, the paper analyzes the optimal institutional
design of DC pension plans based on individual accounts considering a market of funds
featured by incomplete information and incomplete contracts: the capacity to manage
pension savings is non-observable and non-verifiable, but fund managers may indirectly
signal it through some costly technology. The two main contributions of this paper are
improving our understanding of high administrative costs within a competitive market
of pension funds, and exploring possible regulatory or institutional solutions to market
10This is a crucial point of the dispute on the institutional setting of the FF scheme. Among others,
Diamond (2000) and Feldstein (2005a) expressed influential (and opposed) opinions on the possibility that
”public” FF schemes could be ”insulated from political interference”.
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inefficiency.
The simplified setting of our model is characterized by individuals that (mandatorily)
contribute to the FF scheme during their working life to obtain a pension in their retire-
ment life. There is an industry of fund managers competing to manage pension savings,
that cannot be distinguished on the basis of their investment in skill, which nevertheless
affects the expected rate of return they are able to determine. However, assuming that the
FF scheme is organized through a competitive market of pension funds, fund managers
cannot rely on contracts specifying their skill and need some costly effort, say promo-
tion, to affect market expectations about it (Acemoglu et al., 2003). This, in turn, moves
market equilibrium away from first-best Pareto-efficiency.
Our theory of high administrative costs of pension funds affords an assessment of
possible public policies aiming at reducing the inefficiency of the competitive market of
the pension funds. In our model, high administrative costs arise because a costly effort is
required to fund managers to signal they invested in skill, thus more productive. Therefore,
regulations constraining fees or promotion costs of fund managers would hinder signaling,
and in turn destroy the very incentive to invest in skill. Thus, the market equilibrium
induced by these policies is Pareto-dominated by the second-best efficient equilibrium of
the market of pension funds without any policy.
A thorough investigation of possible solutions to market inefficiency requires a (sim-
ple) theory of the functioning of public institutions. In a framework explicitly accounting
for problems determined by political agency and imperfect policy commitment, adding a
public pension fund to the market of private funds improves the social welfare proportion-
ally to its market share, because it reduces management fees. However, because of the
convexity of average costs, the extent of efficiency improvement cannot affect the whole
market unless multiple public pension funds are introduced.
In search of an optimal balance between the potential benefits of public provision and
its costs, a crucial observation is that FF pension schemes integrate two main technological
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and economic phases (Besley and Prat, 2003, 2005): financing (i.e. contribution attrac-
tion) and investment (i.e. asset allocation and management). Investment requires specific
and high value expertise and it is the driver of capital allocation efficiency of FF plans;
conversely, financing is featured by relevant scale economies and it is likely to introduce
perverse incentives, as observed, diverting fund managers from pursuing efficiency (James
et al., 1999; Feldstein, 2005a).
A quasi-competitive pension scheme unbundling financing and investment is, there-
fore, considered: financing is centralized, and the right to manage the collected money
is allocated to private fund managers either by the public agency collecting the money,
through a public procurement mechanism, or by households (if they opt out of the public
agency service). The public procurement mechanism employed by the national agency
to allot money works as a commitment technology to select the right incentives of the
fund managers (namely, to increase actual rate of return on pension savings), neglect-
ing wasteful activities11. Under contract incompleteness, and political and commitment
constraints limiting the functioning of the national agency, the quasi-competitive pension
scheme Pareto-dominates (at least weakly) the market of pension funds that integrates
financing and investment (also considering the case one of the funds in the market is
public).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a simple model of the economy is
presented. Section 3, then, analyzes the competitive market of pension funds, and in
particular establishes its second-best Pareto-efficiency. Section 4 assesses possible public
policies in terms of social welfare, and shows that a quasi-competitive pension scheme
weakly Pareto-dominates the market of pension funds. Section 5 concludes.
11A similar mechanism is used to manage the French PAYG reserve fund (Fonds de re´serve pour les
retraites) that begun its operation in 2004 (FRR, 2006). Greco (2002) proposed this mechanism for small
and transition countries.
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2 The Model
The economy is made by an infinite number of identical households of mass 1. The
utility function of the representative household, uh = v(w − s) + phi , is increasing in its
exogenous income, w and its pension phi , and decreasing in mandatory contribution to the
(funded) pension scheme, s. The pension is determined by a defined contribution rule,
phi = ri ·s · (1−ωi), as the capitalization of contribution invested through the pension-fund
manager i ∈ I, ri ∈ [0,+∞), net of the asset management fee, ωi. The timing of pension
financial investment requires that, during the accumulation period, administrative costs
(hence, management fees ωi) are paid out of workers contributions, the remaining money
(s · (1−ωi)) is actually invested in the pension accumulation plan, yielding ri for each unit
of invested capital12.
Two alternative institutional pension schemes are henceforth considered. In the com-
petitive market of pension funds, households can choose one of the (potentially infi-
nite) fund managers (FMs in Figure 1) that are freely allowed to enter the market:
i ∈ Ic ≡ {1, ..., n}. In the quasi-competitive pension scheme, households are enrolled
in a public pension scheme managed by a national agency (NA in Figure 1), but they
can opt out of this scheme and choose a pension fund in the competitive market (again,
i ∈ Ic).
Whenever households choose a pension fund, the gross rate of return on pension sav-
ings, ri, is a random variable distributed following the probability function F (r | θi)
(twice continuously differentiable), that depends on the investment in skill of the fund
manager: θi ∈ {0, 1}. The probability function is assumed to be identically and inde-
pendently distributed across fund managers, and to be featured by first order stochastic
12The underlying and fairly mild assumption is that the financial cost of borrowing money to cover
(hence, to postpone) administrative costs during the accumulation period is higher (or equal) than the
rate of return of capital accumulated in the pension scheme. Therefore, actual capital accumulation in the
pension scheme is s · (1 − ωi). Moreover, in the very simple structure of this model, we do not take into
account the rather complex structures of pension-fund fees and their links with actual administrative costs
Diamond (2000); Dobronogov and Murthi (2005).
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NA collects s and design {τ, n∗, b∗}
FMs apply and choose θ
HHs may opt for Competitive market
Figure 1: Alternative funded pension schemes
dominance: higher skill raises the probability of high rates of return on managed assets
(F (r | 0) > F (r | 1)). Hence, the expected return is higher for high-skill fund managers
than for low-skill ones: E(r | 1) > E(r | 0). The rate of return that is provided by
the national agency within the quasi-competitive pension scheme depends on the specific
features of such institution (Section 4.3).
3 A competitive market of pension funds
We analyze a competitive market of pension funds in a long run perspective: households
may switch between pension funds along their working life to maximize the expected
pension; fund managers, operating on the market, make non-negative profits; and new
fund managers may enter the market, whenever this involves making positive profits13. In
our simple model of pension funds’ market - taking the form of a sequential game (Figure
1), imposing a long run perspective is equivalent to requiring the sequential rationality of
households and fund managers.
13In our setting, switching costs play no role. However, these are empirically relevant (Dobronogov and
Murthi, 2005). The effect of switching costs in our framework is not straightforward given that these are
likely to reduce the contestability (hence, the efficiency) of the market of pension funds.
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At the first stage, fund managers enter the market, choosing their skill level (θi ∈
{0, 1}), that implies a fixed cost C(θi), namely: being a good (high-skill) fund manager
entails a positive cost C(1) = C ∈ (0, c ·s2); conversely, no fixed cost is associated to entry
in the market as bad (unskilled) fund manager (C(0) = 0). Moreover, the fund manager
i ∈ Ic has to pay a marginal cost 2 · c · bi to manage an asset mass of measure bi ∈ [0, s]
(i.e. the fund manager’s market share).
At the second stage, having observed the number of fund managers that entered the
market, each of them organizes a retail branch of her business, ensuring suitable promo-
tional effort to attract contributions from households. In our view, promotion, mi ∈ <+,
represents a host of different activities - such as, marketing, creative accounting, herding in
portfolio management - involving efficiency losses in the form of costs overrun (or, possibly,
in the form of reduced effective rate of return). Hence, we assume that fund-manager-{i}’s
fixed costs of promotion are c(θi,mi) = γ(θi) ·mi, with γ(1) = γ > 0 and γ(0) = γ + δ
(with δ > 0), hence the cost of promotion is increasing in effort mi, and satisfies the single
crossing condition, ∂mic(0,mi)− ∂mic(1,mi) = δ > 0.
The single crossing assumption on promotion costs is relatively mild: it implies that
high-skill fund managers find it less costly to produce the same promotion effort than low-
skill ones. A first argument supporting such assumption is that real-world governmental
authorities control activities of fund managers conveying (soft) information about their
true skill to households. Thus, low-skill fund managers are likely to incur higher expen-
ditures to spread among people the impression they are good. Moreover, regulation may
involve prudential behaviors and investments that could be more easily met by high-skill,
relying on higher productivity, than low-skill.
In other terms, though promotion activities per se do not convey hard information
to households about actual capacity of fund managers, our single crossing assumption on
promotion costs implies that - whenever information is not fully available to all households
- promotion actually affects the market perception (beliefs) about fund-manager’s skill.
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Each fund manager i ∈ Ic maximizes her profit
pi(ωi,mi; θi) = ωi · bi − c · b2i − C(θi)− γ(θi) ·mi
implementing a promotional effortmi (to signal her skill) and fixing her asset management
fee ωi. Fund manager’s profit is a function of her market share bi that, in turn, depends on
her strategy ({ωi,mi}), on the strategies of competing fund managers ({ωj ,mj}j∈Ic/{i}),
and on households’ beliefs about fund managers’ skills. Given that insurance markets are
incomplete, fund managers who do not cover their costs, in some specific contingency, fail
if such case materializes. Thus, the minimum credible fee that a fund manager can propose
to households has to cover average costs: whenever proposed fee is below average costs,
households anticipate that fund-manager’s loss will be covered by reductions in the return
of asset management.
At the third stage, each household observes the number of fund-managers, n, and their
strategies, {ωj ,mj}j∈Ic , infers the probability that each of them invested in high skill,
{µ(ωj ,mj)}j∈Ic , and then chooses the fund managing its pension savings. The market
share of the fund manager i ∈ Ic is determined as the sum of all households opting for it:
bi =
∫ 1
0 b
h
i dh, where
bhi ≡
{ s if E(pi) > E(pj)
shi ∈ [0, s] if E(pi) = E(pj)
0 if E(pi) < E(pj)
for any i 6= j, with i, j ∈ Ic14. Whenever households are unable to distinguish between
k ∈ N (with k ≥ 2) fund managers, they are assumed to uniformly distribute among them;
14For a given skill, each household chooses the fund manager with lower management fee
bhi |θi=θj≡
{ s if ωi < ωj
shi ∈ [0, s] if ωi = ωj
0 if ωi > ωj
for any i 6= j, with i, j ∈ Ic.
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thus, the market share is equal for all the concerned managers: b = sk . Furthermore, any
fund manager may ration her service with respect to potential market share, b¯i < bi.
3.1 Complete information benchmark
Under complete information, households are able to discriminate fund managers by skill.
Thus, promotion is useless and, since it increases fixed costs, fund managers optimally
fix it to zero (mi = 0) whatever their skill: hence, the payoff function of high-skill fund
managers is pii(1, ωi, 0, bi) = ωi · bi − c · b2i − C; while for low-skill fund managers it is
pij(0, ωj , 0, bj) = ωi · bi − c · b2i .
Let n∗ ∈ N be the number of fund managers operating on the market and λ∗ ∈ [0, 1]
be the share of high-skill ones, at the equilibrium. Moreover,
b∗ ≡ argmin
{
c · b+ C
b
}
=
√
C
c
is the minimum efficient scale of asset management. Under complete information, an
equilibrium of the competitive market of pension funds corresponds to a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the sequential game describing the market, and it is such that (Lemma 8
in the Appendix): all fund managers price at their marginal cost, low-skill ones serve a
trivial (or zero-measure) market share (ω(0) = b(0) = 0), and high-skill serve the minimum
efficient market share (b(1) = b∗, thus ω(1) = ω∗ = 2 · √c · C). Therefore, in equilibrium
(provided that it exists), all fund managers with the same skill propose the same price
and households distribute uniformly among them.
Now, household’s (equilibrium) choice between low- and high-skill fund manager can
be featured. Throughout the paper, we assume that the sufficient condition
E(r | 1) ·
(
1− 2 ·
√
c · C ·
(
1 +
γ
δ
))
> E(r | 0) (1)
holds, insuring that high-skill technology is sufficiently cheap, as compared to the gain in
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increased (expected) return. Thus, each household strictly prefers an high-skill manager
to a low-skill one15.
On these grounds, the existence and features of market equilibrium can be estab-
lished16.
Proposition 1 Under complete information and (1), a Pareto-efficient market equilib-
rium exists, with n∗ high-skill fund managers, if and only if sb∗ = n
∗ ∈ N.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 1 warrants that the minimum
efficient market share is compatible with the existence of the (full information) equilibrium.
In the following, we will assume that it is satisfied, observing that - given other parameters -
an appropriate choice of the mandatory contribution s is sufficient to afford it. Moreover,
given that the market of pension funds is contestable by potential new entrants, the
complete-information equilibrium is first-best Pareto-efficient.
3.2 A competitive market under incomplete information
Many features of the competitive market of pension funds highlight that fund managers’
skills can hardly be considered as a contractible or even observable (Diamond, 2000). Un-
der fund managers’ unobservable and unverifiable skills, the complete information equilib-
rium (involving no promotion effort) is easily shown to be incentive incompatible: assum-
ing that n∗ fund managers play the complete information equilibrium strategy (θ = 1 -
15Conversely, when the fixed cost associated to high-skill (C > 0) is excessively high with respect to
the expected return differential, each household strictly prefers a low-skill manager to an high-skill one:
investing in high-skill technology implies an inefficient allocation of resources. Let us also remark that in
the case of complete information, a condition E(r | 1) · (1 − 2 · √c · C) > E(r | 0) - less restrictive than
(1) - would be sufficient. However, when asymmetric information is introduced fund managers implement
strategies that increase their fixed costs (to signal their skill) and a stronger sufficient condition - say, (1)
- is required.
16The concept of uniqueness does not make an economic sense in the considered framework. There is an
infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria, given the infinite number of potential entrants. However, all
these equilibria share the common features established in Proposition 1 and Lemma 8 (in the Appendix).
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at the first stage, and ω(1) = ω∗ - at the second stage), other fund managers would make
positive profits by entering the market, choosing low-skill (thus, saving on entrance in-
vestment), and pooling with high-skill at the second stage (ω(0) = ω∗). Thus, by classical
lemon-market argument, we have
Proposition 2 Under incomplete information and assuming that promotion is forbidden,
a Pareto-inefficient market equilibrium exists, with an infinite number of low-skill fund
managers.
However, once entered the market, fund managers that invested in skill may signal
their higher productivity to households through promotional activities, entailing higher
fixed costs. To proceed in the analysis of this signaling game, let us recall its timing:
1. (potential) fund managers enter the market, and choose the level of investment in
skill (θi ∈ {0, 1}, for any i ∈ Ic);
2. having observed the number of fund managers operating on the market, each of them
chooses a fee-and-promotion vector ({ωi,mi}, for any i ∈ Ic);
3. having observed the number of fund managers, and their fees-and-promotion vec-
tors, households choose one of them to manage their pension savings, consistently
with its beliefs about the probability that each fund manager invested in skill
({µ(ωi,mi)}i∈Ic).
As usual, the solution is worked out by backward induction. At the end of the first stage,
the number of fund managers operating on the market, n∗, and the share of them choosing
high-skill, λ∗ is determined. Thus, the second and third stages of the game can be treated
as a standard signaling game in which types (here, skills) are exogenously determined.
For given first-stage choices (thus, given n∗ and λ∗), the equilibria of the sub-game made
by stages two and three can be characterized by the vector of subgame strategies of fund
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managers, {ωi,mi}n∗i=1, the beliefs of households (and fund managers), and the choice of
households (i.e. the market share of each fund manager {bi}n∗i=1).
Subgame equilibria, as usual in standard signaling games, can be pooling, when fund
managers play the same subgame strategy {ωp,mp} independently of their skill, or sepa-
rating, when high-skill and low-skill fund managers play different strategies. Let us remark
that, in the subgame pooling equilibrium households do not distinguish among fund man-
agers, hence all fund managers have the same market share. Conversely, in the case of
subgame separating equilibrium households choose high-skill fund managers provided that
the fee they charge is sufficiently low (also with respect to low-skill managers’ fees).
A subgame equilibrium is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the whole game only
if at the first stage - anticipating the subgame equilibrium - no fund manager (including
potential ones) is willing to deviate with respect to her equilibrium strategy (determining
the number of entrants, n∗, and the share of high-skill, λ∗) and households’ equilibrium
beliefs are consistent with the share of high-skill fund managers.
3.2.1 Subgame pooling equilibria
Given n∗ and λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) (determined by first-stage moves of fund managers), a subgame
pooling equilibrium - assuming that it exists - is featured by the subgame strategy {ωp,mp}
implemented by all the n∗ fund managers operating on the market, and a belief µp that
households (and fund managers) share about the probability that a given fund manager
operating on the market is high-skill (provided that she plays the equilibrium strategy).
The expected return warranted by asset management of any fund manager, in the subgame
pooling equilibrium, is
E(r) = µp · E(r | 1) + (1− µp) · E(r | 0)
thus, households distribute uniformly among fund managers (bi = bp).
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Is a subgame pooling equilibrium part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game?
Let us remark that low- and high-skill fund managers have the same fixed cost when
promotion effort is ms = Cδ . Thus, given the subgame pooling equilibrium strategy,
{ωp,mp}, and the individual market share, bp, low-skill fund managers’ profit is strictly
greater than high-skill one, whenever mp < ms. Conversely, low-skill fund managers’
profit is strictly smaller than high-skill one, whenever mp > ms; and the profit of the two
types is the same when mp = ms.
By these considerations, the subgame pooling equilibrium can be represented in the
space of fund-managers subgame strategies as shown in Figure 2. Given the market share,
bp, underlying the subgame pooling equilibrium, the slope of the iso-profit functions is
constant and given by
dmω |θ= γ(θ)
bp
thus, dmω |1< dmω |0 for any subgame pooling equilibrium strategy {ωp,mp}; while the
intercept of profit function is c ·bp+ Cbp , for high-skill fund managers, and c ·bp, for low-skill
ones.
Let us remark that, for relatively high fees and low promotion efforts (region µp of
Figure 2), fund-managers earn non-negative profits independently of their skill: strategies
in this region are candidate to be part of potential subgame pooling equilibria. For inter-
mediate fees and promotion efforts below ms (region µ = 0), only low-skill fund-managers
earn non-negative profits, while high-skill managers would incur in negative profits, thus
strategies in this region are not compatible with subgame pooling equilibria. The same
argument holds for intermediate fees and promotion effort above ms (region µ = 1), where
low-skill fund managers would make negative profits and high-skill fund managers make
non-negative profits. Finally, for low fees and relatively high promotion effort (blank re-
gion), no fund manager can operate and these strategies cannot be part of any equilibrium.
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pi(0, ωp,mp, bp) = 0
pi(1, ωp,mp, bp) = 0
ms
ω
m
6
-
µ = 0
µ = 1
ωs
µp
Figure 2: Households’ beliefs and fund managers’ strategies
With these specifications, we have
Lemma 3 A pooling equilibrium of the subgame, made by stages two and three of the
competitive market of pension funds, is never part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition of Lemma 3 is that a subgame pooling equilibrium cannot be part of the
overall equilibrium of the market of pension funds, given that any fund manager, at the
first stage, can deviate investing in skill and implementing, at the second stage, a fee-and-
promotion subgame strategy in the region µ = 1 of Figure 2. In other terms, investments
in skill (at stage one) and promotion (at stage two) are complement.
3.2.2 Second-best market efficiency
In a subgame separating equilibrium, investment in promotion is useless for low-skill fund
managers, hence they have no fixed costs. As already underlined, ms is the promotion
effort equalizing fixed costs of low- and high-skill. When fund managers implement such
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level of effort, the minimum efficient scale of asset management is
bs =
√
C
c
·
(
1 +
γ
δ
)
and the fee covering the corresponding (minimum) average cost (which insures zero profits)
is
ωs = 2
√
c · C ·
(
1 +
γ
δ
)
With these specifications, the following Lemma characterizes the necessary conditions
for a subgame separating equilibrium to be part of an equilibrium of the market of pension
funds.
Lemma 4 If a separating equilibrium of the subgame, made by stages two and three of the
competitive market of pension funds, is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, then: fee-
and-promotion subgame strategy is {0, 0}, for low-skill fund managers, and {ωs,ms}, for
high-skill ones; households’ beliefs are µ(0, 0) = 0 and µ(ωs,ms) = 1, on-the-equilibrium
path, and
µ(ω′,m′) =
{ 0 if pi(0, ω′,m′, b′) > 0 > pi(1, ω′,m′, b′)
µ′ ∈ [0, µ¯] if pi(0, ω′,m′, b′) ≥ 0 and pi(1, ω′,m′, b′) ≥ 0
1 if pi(0, ω′,m′, b′) < 0 < pi(1, ω′,m′, b′)
off-the-equilibrium path, where µ¯ = min
{
1,
E(r|1)· 1−ωs
1−ω′ −E(r|0)
E(r|1)−E(r|0)
}
; moreover, low-skill fund
managers serve a trivial market share, and high-skill ones serve a market share bs.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The condition imposed by Lemma 4 on households’ beliefs out of the equilibrium insures
that households would not find profitable to choose a deviating fund manager to manage
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their pension savings17. Therefore, fund managers do not find profitable to deviate, and -
by this way - the consistency between equilibrium beliefs (in the subgame made by stages
three and two) and fund managers’ equilibrium strategies (namely, the choice of skill at
stage one) is warranted.
By condition (1), in a subgame separating equilibrium at stages two and three house-
holds never choose low-skill fund managers, thus a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game must be such that at the first stage fund managers that enter the market invest in
skill. By the same argument of Proposition 1, the sufficient and necessary condition for
the existence of second-best efficient market equilibrium18 is found (with ns < n∗)
Proposition 5 Under incomplete information and (1), a market equilibrium exists, with
ns high-skill fund managers, if and only if sbs(1) = n
s ∈ N.
Assuming that high-skill is always a worthy investment in social terms - condition (1),
asymmetric information without any signaling technology determines a stark inefficiency
result, by forcing high-skill managers (that necessarily have to bear fixed costs) out of the
market. However, following the traditional idea of signaling models, some costly activities
(here, promotion) can be undertaken by good managers to signal their capacity.
4 Efficiency-enhancing public policies?
In our model, market equilibrium is second-best efficient: signaling corrects fund man-
agers’ incentives under asymmetric information, enticing them to invest in skill. However,
signaling involves a welfare loss with respect to complete information, that can be mea-
17The upper bound to the beliefs of households observing off-the-equilibrium path behaviors implies that
[µ′ ·E(r | 1)+ (1−µ′) ·E(r | 0)] · (1−ω′) ≤ E(r | 1) · (1−ωs). This refinement of the subgame separating
equilibrium derives by the sequential rationality involved in the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
applied to the market of pension funds. Moreover, by condition (1), µ¯ is always strictly positive.
18Also under asymmetric information: equilibrium existence requires compatibility between minimum
efficient scale and stable market configuration (i.e. a finite number of operating fund managers); an infinite
multiplicity of (identical) equilibria are possible.
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sured in terms of lost expected pension
∆E(p|∗s) = E(p∗)− E(ps) = E(r | 1) · s · (ωs − ω∗) > 0 (2)
with ωs−ω∗ = 2 ·√c · C ·(√1 + γδ −1); where E(p∗) = E(r | 1) ·s ·(1−ω∗) is the expected
pension in first-best market equilibrium and E(ps) = E(r | 1) · s · (1− ωs) is the expected
pension in second-best market equilibrium.
As stressed in the introduction, the efficiency loss determined by high administrative
costs is rather relevant in terms of reduced rates of return on pension savings. As a
consequence, economic policy debate on pension funds, in many countries, has particulary
focussed on ways to reduce these losses, improving pension funds’ performance. As argued,
some solutions that have been suggested to enhance the market of pension funds rely on
regulations of some aspects of competition among fund managers: cap to management
fees; costs regulations, encompassing or hindering promotional activities; or restraints to
pension funds’ fees by setting up a public pension fund competing in the market with
private ones19.
What our simple model can say about these policy proposals? Before answering, it
is worth remarking that much of the sound economics grounding the three considered
proposals relies on the view that one of the sources of inefficiency of the market of pension
funds is imperfect competition. From this point of view, regulating revenues or costs,
or introducing a public competitor should enhance market competition tending towards
first-best.
In this paper, we formalized an innovative view of the inefficiency disease of the market
of pension funds, focusing on incomplete information20. There is no doubt that asymmetric
information and imperfect competition both affect the working of the real-world market of
19A similar mechanism is operating, for example, in Sweden (Sunde´n, 2004) and it has been proposed
for the UK (Turner et al., 2006, chapter 10).
20The role of asymmetric information has sometimes been informally evoked in the debate on high costs
of pension funds, e.g. Diamond (2000).
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pension funds. Though the latter problem seems less deeply rooted: after all, pension funds
are part of the wider class of financial markets, and a persistent (long run) situation of
low contestability should find some political economy explanation. Conversely, asymmetric
information seems to be intimately related to the very nature of funded pensions.
4.1 Inefficient fees or costs regulations
Our model affords an handful assessment of the welfare effect of the first two policy pro-
posals: regulation of revenues or costs. Assuming that these policies are fully effective
(say, all fund managers perfectly comply) and the constraints they introduce are binding
(say, actually affect the market equilibrium), the two alternative regulations (fees or costs)
produce the same effect: fund managers that, at the first stage, invest in skill would be
prevented from signaling it to the market (by promotion). Constraints to management fees
would restrain financing capacity and, hence, signaling; similarly, limitations to promo-
tional activities would directly cap signaling expenditures. By Proposition 2, limitation to
signaling would increase market inefficiency given that only low-skill fund managers would
enter the market.
However, in a world of incomplete contracts, implementing regulations to management
fees and promotional activities could bring to very different results, because of effective-
ness of regulations and costs of enforcing them. Intuitively, capping management fees
should be easier and more effective than preventing all possible activities that are related
to promotion. Under such different setting, constraints to management fees are likely to
be effective, hindering signaling and increasing market inefficiency. As regards limitations
to expenditures for promotional activities (as marketing), fund managers may elude regu-
lations and, thus, implementing signaling, reaching second-best efficiency (Proposition 5).
In turn, this would imply that regulation is ineffective in curbing administrative costs or,
even worst, regulations - by inducing fund managers to elusion practices - could increase
the marginal cost of promotional activities (say, γ), and in turn could bring to second-best
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efficient equilibria Pareto-dominated by the market of pension funds in absence of any
public regulation of promotional activities.
Our model also suggests a possible direction to improve regulation and, thus, market
efficiency affecting promotion technology. Given the cost technology of fund management
and skill investment, the efficiency loss (2) is decreasing in the difference between the
marginal cost of promotion for low- and high-skill fund managers (δ). As δ grows, market
equilibrium tends to move towards first-best efficiency (∆E(p|s∗) decreases). A richer model
would be necessary to investigate the potential role of government in the optimal (say, cost-
minimizing) selection of signals by market players (Bernheim and Redding, 2001). To
illustrate the intuition: promotional activities directly conveying (soft) information about
fund manager skill should be allowed, and governmental authorities should control the
correspondence between claimed and true data; promotional activities less directly related
with the pension business should be discouraged, thus inducing an optimal selection of
signals by high-skill fund managers. In our model, these mechanisms would completely
solve the problem. In more complex settings and in the real world, public monitoring is
costly and raises typical political economy concerns.
4.2 A public pension fund competing in the market
The third policy - the public pension fund, competing with private ones - requires to be
more specific about the skill of the public fund manager. To illustrate, in the case of the
Swedish market of pension funds, often considered a success case, the public pension fund
plays a crucial role as default option for households: aiming at warranting low risk but
also fairly good returns. Thus, the benchmark for the performance of the public fund
manager is (legally) fixed at the top-25% rates-of-return of private funds (Sunde´n, 2004,
p. 3). In our bare setting, this would be equivalent to consider that the public fund is set
up to be high-skill!
Is such a policy credible? The answer hinges on people’s confidence in the capacity of
22
the public institutions to pursue public interest. To catch this point, we need a simple
theory of public institutions explicitly considering that there is a political agency problem
and that households are aware of it. Households are assumed to know the ex ante prob-
ability that the public fund is benevolent (i.e. it implements a socially optimum policy),
α ∈ [0, 1], representing the degree of credibility of such institution. Therefore, households
expect that, with a probability 1−α, the public fund is self-interested and maximizes the
fund’s profit21. Moreover, we assume that the nature of the public fund is determined
before market competition begins and it can act as a Stackelberg leader.
4.2.1 Observable nature of public fund manager
As a benchmark, let us first consider that the nature of the public fund is observable. A
benevolent public fund manager would always invest in skill, given that (1) holds, thus
incurring in fixed costs C. Given that public fund type is observable, being public is
a credible and free signal to the market, thus the public fund manager does not need
investing in promotional activities. Moreover, the public fund will charge a fee that is
always equal to its average costs22, ωg = c · bg + Cbg , and would choose its market share,
bg, to maximize the social welfare.
Private fund managers will play the same game they played in absence of the public
fund, competing on the market share that is left after public fund chooses its optimal
policy: s − bg. Thus, if an equilibrium still exists, the only difference with the case of
pure private market is in the number of operating private fund managers. Therefore, the
best policy for the the (benevolent) public fund manager is to choose the market share,
bg, maximizing the social welfare or, equivalently, the total saving on management fees
bg · (ωs − ωg) = bg · ωs − c · bg2 − C
21The underlying idea is that public pension fund profit is the stake that is divided between government’s
officials.
22We are here excluding, as it seems to be the case in reality, that the public fund is allowed to cover
losses with transfers by government.
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thus, the optimal policy for the benevolent public fund manager is bg = bs and ωg =
c · bs + Cbs .
Given that a single public fund manager competing with private fund managers can
efficiently serve just bs, say 1ns of the entire market, the welfare effect of the introduction
of the public fund, measured in terms of increase of the average (expected) pension with
respect to the second-best in absence of it, is
∆E(ps+gs ) = E(p
s+g)−E(ps) = E(r | 1) · s · (ω
s − ωg)
ns
> 0
with ωs−ωg = √c · C · γ√
δ·√δ+γ ; where E(p
s+g) = E(r | 1) · [bs · (1−ωg)+(s−bs) · (1−ωs)]
is the (average) expected pension in the second-best market equilibrium with the public
pension fund and E(ps) = E(r | 1) · s · (1−ωs) is the expected pension in the second-best
market equilibrium (without the public pension fund). ∆E(ps+gs ) increases as the market
share, bs, grows and the differential between marginal costs of promotion for low and high
skill fund managers, δ, dwindles.
If the public fund is self-interested (and perceived as such by households) it will have
the same incentives of other (private) fund managers. Thus, households would choose the
public fund to manage their savings only if they receive credible signals that it invested
in skill. Assuming that public and private financial and signaling technologies are similar,
the only way to communicate this is by investing in promotion, thus increasing fixed costs.
Therefore, the self-interested public fund manager would serve a market share bs and would
charge a fee ωs as other fund managers.
4.2.2 Unobservable nature of the public fund manager
Let us turn to consider the main case in which households cannot observe the type (benevo-
lent or self-interested) of the public fund manger, but have an exogenous belief - say, linked
to the working of the political system and public institutions - about the probability that
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it is benevolent, α. Then, the following result can be established
Proposition 6 Under incomplete information and (1), a competitive market of pension
funds with a public pension fund weakly Pareto-dominates a market without it.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition of the proof is that the self-interested public fund manager would mimick
the benevolent one, by offering a contract with a fee ωg and zero promotion, and would
not invest in skill. Households rationally anticipate this, but as far as the probability that
the public fund manager is benevolent is sufficiently high, say above the threshold
α¯ =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ωg −E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)−E(r | 0)
(that takes values between zero and one, whenever (1) holds), the expected pension that
the public fund provides, considering the uncertainty about the institutional nature of it,
is higher than the one of private fund managers. Thus, for α ≥ α¯ the introduction of a
public fund in the competitive market of pension funds (weakly) improves the expected
pension (and, hence, expected social welfare).
When α < α¯, the expected pension of the public fund is lower than private ones, hence
households would choose private fund managers, and the only strategy that the public
fund can implement to attract pension savings - independently of its type - is to signal
investment in skill through promotion. Hence, for a low level of credibility of the public
fund, this policy tool cannot improve expected social welfare but it does not worsen it.
Therefore, the expected improvement in social welfare
∆E(ps+gs |α) =
{
∆E(ps+gs )− (1− α) · (E(r|1)−E(r|0))·s·(1−ω
g)
ns α ≥ α¯
0 α < α¯
declines with public fund credibility, reaching a minimum of zero for α ≤ α¯.
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Contrary to what we observed in the case of price or cost capping, a public pension
fund - also taking into account political agency problems - may improve the social welfare
by restraining management fees. Furthermore, competition between public and private
funds affords households an effective tool to keep their pension at least at the same level
that the competitive market of pension funds would reach in absence of the public fund.
However, the capacity of the public fund to improve social welfare is limited by the
second-best efficient market share. The way the public pension funds affords a Pareto-
improvement in the competitive market of pension funds, say by reducing the management
fees without limiting too much the expected return (related to political agency concerns),
brings us to the following consideration: efficiency could be enhanced even more by multi-
plying the number of public pension funds, thus allowing them to operate at their minimum
efficient scale (given that fixed costs exclude promotion), b∗, that in turn would restrain
management fees at their minimum efficient level (for fund managers that invested in
skill), ω∗.
Moreover, the public pension fund improves social welfare just by substituting one of
private pension funds that, because of the signaling game, may be more costly whereas
the public pension fund could rely on public institution credibility (if sufficiently high)
to avoid costly investments in signalling. Along these considerations we would reach the
provocative view of a quasi-market of pension funds: say, a de facto nationalization by
substituting private funds with multiple public funds competing among each others! The
assessment of this view would require a thorough investigation of the working of public
institutions that is out of the reach of our analysis.
4.3 A quasi-competitive pension scheme
All considered proposals fail to intervene on the very mechanism generating high costs and
fees: bad incentives created by competition among fund managers to attract contributions
(Acemoglu et al., 2003). All FF pension schemes based on individual accounts, requiring
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households to choose their fund manager, foster costly signaling too.
A radically different approach to solve the problem of incentive selection is explored
in this section. The quasi-competitive pension scheme is based on the idea that public
institutions may have enhanced contracting technologies with respect to single households.
Again we assess this intuition in a framework explicitly taking into account that public
institutions are affected by political agency problems and that commitment capacity may
be limited.
The quasi-competitive pension scheme is structured as follows:
1. All households are enrolled in a public pension scheme managed by a national agency
that collects households’ pension savings, s, and allocate the rights to manage a
number of predetermined shares of them to private fund managers through a public
procurement mechanism.
2. Private fund managers observe the public procurement mechanism and decide whether
to participate or not and their investment in skill.
3. Households may opt out of the public scheme and allocate their pension savings
directly to private fund managers operating on a competitive market.
The underlying assumption of the quasi-competitive scheme is that the national agency
can design a mechanism allocating collected savings to private fund managers participating
to the public procurement mechanism, involving a payment that can be linked to the long-
term performance of fund managers23. Here is the major divide between the competitive
market of pension funds and the quasi-competitive pension scheme: private fund managers
(competing to attract pension savings) cannot write credible contracts with workers to link
their fees to asset management performance24, in bad contingencies (r low) they would
23An equivalent way to put it is to consider that government can tax with sufficiently rich instruments
the private managers operating on the market.
24Or, equivalently, high-skill fund managers cannot design credible contracts allowing them to signal their
skill through management fees instead of promotion (that would reduce the main source of pension-fund
market inefficiency).
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fail and households’ pension would necessarily be determined as residual claim (i.e. gross
return on invested assets less operating and fixed costs of failed manager).
Conversely, the national agency is able to design contracts with single fund managers
allowing also for their default, given that it is able to pool such risks and compensate
them on aggregate. In other terms, the national agency is able to commit to optimal
payment functions linking the contingent profit of fund managers to their performance;
as a consequence, some fund managers fail in some states of the world and the national
agency is the residual claimant of failed fund managers.
In the following, we consider three potential limits affecting the capacity of the national
agency to improve the social welfare, with respect to the competitive market of pension
funds. As first, the capacity of the national agency to rely on tax-financed revenues is
limited by the fact that each unit of tax revenues (that, in this setting, finances private
fund managers’ profits) has a social marginal cost equal to 1 + φ, with φ > 0 (because
of taxation distortion and/or different social weighting of private profits with respect to
consumers’ surplus). Moreover, the functioning of the national agency is affected by a
political agency constraint: again in the form of exogenous probability that the national
agency is benevolent, α; thus, with probability 1 − α, the national agency is captured
by the sector of the fund managers and pursue the task to maximize their aggregated
profits. Finally, the national agency capacity to link the payment function rewarding fund
managers to their performance may be limited by commitment problems.
4.3.1 Observable nature of the national agency
A benevolent national agency will adopt an optimal mechanism implementing the social
optimum under the information and taxation constraints (assuming away commitment
problems). The national agency maximizes a social welfare function given by the sum
of households’ expected welfare and private fund managers’ expected profits, net of the
cost of taxation. By condition (1), the optimal mechanism has to induce some fund
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managers’ to participate and to invest in skill: the first-best optimal number of (high-
skill) fund managers is n∗ = sb∗ , where b
∗ is the efficient operative scale of pension-savings
management25.
The public procurement mechanism implies a payment from the national agency to
each fund manager, i ∈ I, actually managing a lot b∗ of pension savings that, without
loss of generality, we assume made by two parts: a fixed part covering variable and fixed
costs, c · b∗2 + C26, that is observable and verifiable, and a variable part that depends on
fund managers’ performance, τi(r) (with r the vector of rates of return obtained by fund
managers), that we assume unverifiable.
The non-contingent part of public procurement payment covers total costs of fund
managers that invested in skill, thus the net contingent profit of each fund manager is
given by pi(r, θi) = C − C(θi) + τi(r). Therefore, whenever the performance of a fund
manager that invested in skill implies that the performance-related payment is negative,
the concerned fund manager fails and its assets and liabilities are taken by national agency
acting as residual claimant.
Under these specifications, the program of the national agency is27
max
{τi(r)}i∈I,r∈Rn∗+
∑
i∈I
b∗E(ri | 1) · (1− ω∗)− φ ·
∑
i∈I
E(τi(r) | 1)
s.t. (3)
E(τi(r) | 1) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
E(τi(r) | 1) ≥ C + E(τi(r) | 0,1−i) ∀i ∈ I
25Whenever the mechanism is able to correctly induce self-selection of fund managers, it is well possible
that more than n∗ high-skill fund managers apply to manage a part of pension savings. In such a case,
we assume that government randomly select just n∗ fund managers. In the following, we just exclude
this situation and let I be the optimal set of fund managers that participate to the public procurement
mechanism.
26To illustrate, this part is subtracted by pension savings and is paid before the fund manager perfor-
mance is known.
27To lighten the notation let E(. | 1) = ∫∞
0
...
∫∞
0
(.) ·∏j∈I f(rj |1) · drj and E(. | 0,1−i) = ∫∞0 ... ∫∞0 (.) ·∏
j∈I/{i} f(rj |1) · drj · f(ri|0) · dri.
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where the first constraint insures participation of fund managers that invested in skill, and
the second constraint insures incentive-compatibility. By the first order conditions of the
program, the first constraint is always binding and the second constraint is never, thus the
national agency does not extract - on average - tax revenues to finance the mechanism.
The mechanism designed by the national agency implements the first best Pareto-
efficient allocation, thus households would never opt out of the public scheme. Given
the allocation mechanism underlying the public procurement scheme, that is trivially
determined by the simple structure of the problem, many different payment functions can
implement it.
What happens when the national agency is self-interested (and households observe it)?
Now the agency is willing to extract the maximum surplus by the households, thus the
participation constraints of the latter are binding: unless the national agency designs a
policy that credibly provides households with at least the same pension they would get in
the competitive market, they would opt out of the public scheme. But, as investment in
skill is not verifiable, assuming that a self-interested national agency has no way to prove
that the designed public procurement mechanism induces the right level of investment in
skill, households would always opt out.
4.3.2 Unobservable nature of the national agency
Let us turn to consider the case in which the national agency continues to face no limitation
as regards commitment capacity, but its very nature (benevolent or self-interested) is no
more observable or verifiable. Thus we have
Proposition 7 Under incomplete information and (1), a quasi-competitive pension scheme
weakly Pareto-dominates a competitive market of pension funds (with or without a public
pension fund).
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Now, the self-interested national agency may mimick the benevolent one, by con-
sequently choosing the observable features of the public procurement mechanism. As
argued, the contingent part of the payment is assumed to be non-verifiable. There-
fore, the self-interested national agency chooses n∗ fund managers with profit function
pi(r, θi) = C − C(θi) + τi(r). In this case, the objective function of the national agency is
defined as the difference between the total profit of pension fund managers and the total
cost of taxation, hence:
∑
i∈I(C − C(θi))− φ ·
∑
i∈I E(τi(r) | θ).
Given the number of fund managers and the investment in skill that the optimal
contract induces, also for the self-interested national agency it is an optimal policy to
reduce as much as possible the expected cost of taxation, namely to put it to zero. However,
the public agency does not implement the optimal investment in skill given that it would
entail a cost that, in the objective function of the self-interested public agency, does not
yield any benefit.
Also in this case, households anticipate this behavior of the self-interested national
agency and they nevertheless prefer to remain in the public scheme if the expected pension
so determined is higher than the one offered on the competitive market of pension funds.
This happens for a sufficiently high probability that the national agency is, actually,
benevolent. Let
α˜ =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ω∗ − E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)−E(r | 0)
be the threshold level of public institution’s credibility such that for higher values, house-
holds remain in the public scheme and for lower levels they opt out. α˜, takes values
between zero and one whenever (1) holds. When the credibility is low (α < α˜) the na-
tional agency, either benevolent or self-interested has no credible strategy to convince
households that the designed mechanism affords a proper selection of incentives for fund
managers inducing investment in skill.
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The capacity of the quasi-competitive pension scheme to outperform the market of
pension funds, also in the case this is improved by a public pension fund, relies on the
capacity of the national agency to determine an optimal sharing of pension savings among
fund managers thus exploiting the efficiency gains of reaching minimum efficient scales of
fund management. The expected gain in terms of pension is
∆E(pps+g|α) =
{ ∆E(p∗s)− (1− α) · (E(r|1)− E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗)−∆E(ps+gs |α) α ≥ α¯
∆E(p∗s)− (1− α) · (E(r|1)− E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗) α ∈ [α˜, α¯)
0 α < α˜
Given that ωg, the fee chosen by the public fund competing with the private ones is
not the minimum efficient fee (because the market size is not the minimum efficient one),
say ω∗, that conversely is applied by the national agency in the framework of the quasi-
competitive pension scheme, then it can easily be checked that α¯ > α˜. In other terms, the
credibility of the public institutions with respect to the objective of pursuing the public
interest that is required by a quasi-private pension scheme is lower than what is needed
to the public fund competing in the private market to afford an increase of the expected
pension (thus, an improvement of the social welfare).
The result is rather intuitive given that the quasi-competitive mechanism relies on the
full power of the public mechanisms, while the public fund is a rather restrained policy
tool. Thus, for high credibility levels the public scheme Pareto-dominates a market that
optimally allows for a public pension fund competing with private ones. For intermediate
credibility levels (α ∈ [α¯, α˜)), a public pension fund cannot improve on a pure private
market of pension funds but the public scheme does. And for low credibility levels, the
quasi-competitive scheme cannot improve on the market of pension funds: the expected
pension of the public scheme is low and people opt out.
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4.3.3 Introducing commitment constraints
Proposition 7 is grounded on the assumption that the national agency within a quasi-
competitive mechanism can perfectly commit to the optimal payment functions. In real
world, public procurement mechanisms are often affected by time consistency, renegoti-
ation, or collusion concerns. In the following, we focus on two limits related to time-
consistency of optimal payment functions. As first, government (through the national
agency) could be ex post concerned with the fact that too many fund managers may fail
in some particularly averse contingencies, and thus could deviate from the optimal pay-
ment if it involves allowing such failures. In a long run perspective, fund managers and
households would anticipate such time-inconsistent behavior and, in turn, a truly optimal
payment function should be robust against it. Conversely, if the optimal payment function
involves high payments in some contingencies, government could ex post consider it too
much generous. Again, fund managers would anticipate it.
Introducing commitment problems may reduce the capacity of the quasi-competitive
mechanism of outperforming the competitive market of pension funds. To illustrate this is-
sue, in this section we consider an extreme case of commitment limits to the public scheme:
as first, the national agency cannot credibly act as residual claimant, thus the payment
function has always to afford non-negative contingent profits to fund managers; more-
over, contingent profits of fund managers are limited by an upper non-contingent bound,
τ¯ . It is worth to remark that, by introducing the considered lower bound, the contracts
that the national agency is able to implement through the public procurement mechanism
have the same limitation featuring contracts between pension funds and households in the
competitive market.
Therefore, the program (3) of the benevolent national agency has to satisfy two addi-
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tional constraints28
τi(r) ≥ 0 (4)
τ¯ ≥ τi(r) (5)
for all i ∈ I and r ∈ Rn∗+ . By the first order conditions of this new program the partici-
pation constraint is proven to be always non-binding (E(τi(r) | 1) > 0) and the incentive
constraint to be always binding (E(τi(r) | 1) = C + E(τi(r) | 0,1−i)), because of the
commitment constraint (4) - see Lemma 9 in the Appendix.
The commitment constraints (namely, the lower bound) involve an efficiency loss with
respect to the first best due to the fact that the incentive constraint of the program
(3), under the commitment constraint (4), is always binding and requires a non-binding
participation constraint, that in turn involves net tax-financing to the scheme, to provide
positive profits to fund managers participating to public procurement.
As a consequence, the scope for a welfare enhancing quasi-competitive scheme is re-
duced, because of a divergence between the net benefit of the public scheme perceived by
future pensioners, say the expected pension
(α · E(r|1) + (1− α) · E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗)
and the net benefit for society as a whole, that is equal to the expected pension net of
taxes
(α · E(r|1) + (1− α) · E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗)− α · φ · n∗ · E(τ∗(r)|1) (6)
where E(τ∗(r)|1) is the optimal expected payment solving the program (3) under con-
straints (4) and (5).
28The program of the self-interested national agency is not modified given that it has no interest in
provide incentives to fund managers to invest in skills.
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Unless we consider that taxes financing the public procurement payment are collected
only from households enrolled in the public scheme (and that they rationally understand
it), they continue to consider profitable to stay in the public scheme as far as the credibility
of the national agency is above α˜, and to opt out when it is below this level. However, for
credibility of national agency managing the public scheme below29
α˜c =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ω∗ − E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)− E(r | 0)− φ · E(τ∗(r)|1)b∗·(1−ω∗)
the net social welfare is lower than what is obtained through the competitive market of
pension funds, E(r|1) · s · (1 − ω∗). Let us observe that α˜c > α˜ whenever the marginal
cost of taxation is higher than one (φ > 0). Therefore, for all α ∈ (α˜, α˜c) the quasi-
competitive scheme under commitment constraints strictly reduces the expected social
welfare as compared to the market of pension funds, while for higher public credibility the
expected social welfare increases and for lower public credibility households opt out of the
public scheme. Hence, Proposition 7 does no more hold: the quasi-competitive scheme
does not Pareto-dominate (nor it is Pareto-dominated by) the market of pension funds.
The mechanics of such negative results, that is determined by the divergence between
private benefits of future pensioners and social welfare, suggest a minor amendment to
the quasi-competitive scheme restoring our main result established in Proposition 7: let
the performance-related payment be financed just by households enrolled in the public
scheme, say as an extension of management fees. Under this specification, the net benefit
that households obtain from the public scheme becomes
(α · E(r|1) + (1− α) · E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗)− α · (1 + φ) · n∗ · E(τ∗(r)|1) (7)
29For the sake of simplicity we just consider that the alternative is the competitive market of pension
funds, without any public fund competing in it. Let us also remark that, for φ · n∗ · τ¯ ≤ ∆E(p∗s) (where
φ·n∗ ·τ¯ is the maximum tax cost of the performance-related payment), α˜c < 1 hence the public procurement
mechanism improves on the competitive market for some feasible α.
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the entire cost30 of additional financing to the public procurement scheme is borne by
future pensioners. Therefore, now households out out of the public scheme for credibility
levels below
α˜C =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ω∗ − E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)− E(r | 0)− (1 + φ) · E(τ∗(r)|1)b∗·(1−ω∗)
Let us remark that α˜C > α˜c: for credibility levels between these two values, the
expected social welfare could be increased, with respect to the quasi-competitive scheme,
by another mechanism forcing households to stay in the public scheme. However, the most
important point is that for these values the market of pension funds delivers a worst result.
Therefore, the Proposition 7 is restored: restricting the financing of the payment function
to be supported just by future pensioners, the quasi-competitive mechanism again weakly
Pareto-dominates the market of pension funds.
5 Conclusion
The economic literature on mandatory funded pensions has informally argued that high
administrative costs of pension funds based on individual accounts originate by imperfect
competition and asymmetric information. On this ground, policy proposals have been
suggested aiming at restraining the rise of costs and fees (by directly limiting fees and
costs or by increasing the competitive pressure through a public pension fund). Imperfect
competition may be rather relevant to explain this phenomenon in the start up phase
of markets of pension funds. However, in the long run it seems that this financial sector
should converge towards a competitive setting. The empirical assessment of this prediction
is still poor and further research is probably required on this point. Nevertheless, existing
empirical analysis on the structure and determinants of administrative costs and fees
30Here φ represents higher weight that a benevolent national agency would attribute to the consumers’
surplus, with respect to private funds’ profits, rather than efficiency costs of taxation.
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seems to show that imperfect competition is only a part of the story, probably not the
most important one.
To explore the role of incomplete information in determining high costs and fees of
pension funds, we considered a model in which fund managers’ management skill is not
observable or verifiable. In this setting, a competitive market of pension funds fails to
reach first-best. If good managers cannot signal their capacity to the market, a stark
version of the traditional lemon-market argument applies: only bad managers stay on the
market in equilibrium, given that good fund managers are unable to cover fixed costs of
investment in skill. If good managers are able to signal their skill through some costly
promotional activity (as we observe in real-world markets of pension funds), then the
efficiency of market equilibrium improves, though first-best cannot be reached because of
deadweight losses determined by promotion costs.
On this ground, policies directly restraining management fees or costs are deemed to
increase market inefficiency, rather than reducing it. Conversely, also taking into account
political agency problems, a public fund competing in the market of pension funds is
likely to improve the social welfare, by reducing management fees for the portion of the
market it is able to serve. However, this solution is limited by the fact that public-
private competition hinders an optimal management scale for the public pension fund.
Then, we considered a radically different approach relying on the observation that the
main problem of the pension funds’ market is related to the competition for pensions’
contribution attraction.
We defined a quasi-competitive scheme which is conceived as a tool to select fund
managers’ incentives, relying on the full power of collective mechanisms. A national agency
is charged to collect pension savings and to allot them to private fund managers through
a public procurement mechanism. Fund managers, then, decide to participate or not
and whether they invest in skill. Finally, households may opt out of the public scheme,
which insures that the results obtained in it cannot drop below what the market could
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deliver. Our main result is that this quasi-competitive pension scheme determines an
higher (or not lower) social welfare than the market of pension funds also taking into
account political agency and commitment problems. As argued with a simple example,
commitment issues are very important to correctly design the functioning of the public
procurement mechanism and afford an effective mechanism that is likely to improve on the
market of pension funds. However, we argued that this - as the political agency problem -
is not a prohibitive constraint on the way of the optimal design of funded pensions, though
first best results are, in general, unreachable.
Admittedly, our bare analysis leaves unexplored many important issues. Two crucial
extensions should focus on the analysis of dynamics and of the way moral hazard affects
asset management (after fund skill has been determined). As regards model dynamics,
one could imagine that the mere repetition of the game could create a scope for reputation
equilibria: high-skill fund managers could signal their capacity by the simple observation
of past rates of return. This intuitive result could not be robust to two features of the
considered market: first, investment in skill has to be repeated during time rather often
(e.g. investments to keep an high management standard); moreover, this feature is likely
to foster entrance of new fund managers as far as profits arise on the market.
Another related issue is that fund managers’ signals passing through the very fund
management policy, say the rate of return, is affected by problems similar to the one
analyzed in this paper: fund managers may be very interested in providing the right
(short term) signal to the market, e.g. beating the (short term) financial benchmark, and
they could waste some opportunities in a longer run perspective. Considering a similar
problem, Prat (2005) underlines the role of commitment in incentive selection.
An important implication of our analysis is about the public service nature of manda-
tory private pensions. The privatization of the mandatory scheme of funded pension is
limited by market failure. Namely, asymmetric information affects the functioning of
the competitive market of pension funds very deeply. Trying to solve this problem - be
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it through heavy regulations of the market of pension funds or through a full-fledged
public-private mechanism as the one proposed here - necessarily requires to set up public
institutions and rules that, by their very nature, are exposed to the interference of the
political system. Which is always intimately true for any public service. Failure to con-
sider the public nature of private pensions brings to overlook the potentially devastating
relevance - in terms of economic and fiscal risks - of implicit contingent liabilities that the
working of a pension system (be it private or public) involves for the public sector and the
whole society.
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Appendix
Lemma 8 Under complete information, if a market equilibrium exists, all fund managers
price at their marginal costs; moreover: (1) each low-skill fund manager serves a trivial
market share b(0) = 0; (2) each high-skill fund manager serves the minimum efficient
market share b(1) = b∗.
Proof. All fund managers operating on the market in equilibrium earn zero profits,
otherwise - at the first stage - other fund managers would enter undercutting them. Thus,
low-skill fund managers, in equilibrium, serve a trivial market share - which implies mar-
ginal cost pricing, and high-skill fund managers price at their average cost. Remark that,
by assumption, C < c · s2, hence b∗ < 1. Assume, by contradiction, that (at least) the
high-skill fund manager i ∈ Ic has a market share bi 6= b∗. If bi > b∗, the average cost is
higher than the minimum. Then, another high-skill fund manager, j, may enter the mar-
ket and make positive profits: offering a contract to a rationed market share b¯j ∈ [b∗, bi),
at a fee ωj ∈ (c · b¯j + Cb¯j , ωi). Assume, now, that bi < b
∗: the average cost is higher
than the minimum. If at least another high-skill fund manager j operating on the market
has bj < b∗, with fee ωj = c · bj + Cbj , she can make positive profits by an appropriate
reduction of her fee, thus attracting a portion of the market share of i. Assume that all
fund managers but i operate at the minimum efficient scale (b∗). Then, households served
by i (at an higher fee) would opt for others but are rationed: any other high-skill fund
manager can make positive profits by increasing fee and widening her market share. Thus,
in equilibrium, b(1) = b∗ and also high-skill fund managers price at the marginal cost.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 8, low- and high-skill fund managers price
at their marginal cost, hence by (1) households always opt for the latter ones that uni-
formly share the market among them. The sufficient condition is straightforward. For the
necessary condition, if sb∗ is not an integer the equilibrium does not exist. Assume, by
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contradiction, that it exists: let n∗∗ be the (integer) number of high-skilled fund managers
operating on the market. By Lemma 8, high-skill fund manager price at their marginal
(and average minimum) cost and serve the minimum efficient market share; hence neces-
sarily n∗∗ < sb∗ , implying that a non-trivial mass s− n∗∗ · b∗ of households would remain
unsatisfied. Thus, any incumbent fund manager could raise her fee and serve the remain-
ing market share.
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume, by contradiction, that a subgame pooling equilib-
rium in stages two and three is part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the competitive
market of pension funds. In equilibrium all fund managers earn zero profits, that implies
mp = ms, otherwise the subgame pooling strategy would imply different profits for fund
managers with different skills. By the same arguments of Lemma 8, bp is equal to the mini-
mum efficient scale
√
C
c ·
(
1 + γδ
)
. However, this cannot be part of a market equilibrium,
given that, at the first stage, a fund manager could deviate and make positive profits:
entering the market, investing in skill and credibly implementing a strategy {ω′,m′} in
the neighborhood of {ωp,mp} - such that b′ is the corresponding minimum efficient scale,
and pi(1, ω′,m′, b′) > 0 > pi(0, ω′,m′, bp), thus convincing households that she invested in
high skill.
Proof of Lemma 4. In a subgame separating equilibrium, high-skill fund managers
implement a promotion effort ms: a lower effort would afford profitable deviations for low-
skill fund managers mimicking high-skill; a higher effort would afford profitable deviations
for high-skill fund managers undercutting incumbents. Then, fee and market share derive
as in Lemma 8. As regards households’ beliefs, the condition on beliefs out of the equi-
librium insures that households would never choose a deviating fund manager proposing
them a fee ω′ < ωs (i.e. [µ′ · E(r | 1) + (1− µ′) · E(r | 0)] · (1− ω′) ≤ E(r | 1) · (1− ωs)),
otherwise a low-skill fund manager could make positive profits by proposing a deviation
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with {ω′,m′} in a suitable neighborhood of {ωs,ms}.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us consider, first, that at the incomplete informa-
tion equilibrium a benevolent public fund manager implements its complete information
equilibrium strategy (investing in skill at the first stage, and choosing ωg and zero promo-
tion at the second stage), and households are willing to choose the public fund. Then a
self-interested public fund manager would mimick the benevolent one at the second stage
without investing in skill at the first stage. This is an equilibrium if and only if
(α · E(r|1) + (1− α) · E(r|0)) · s · (1− ωg) ≥ E(r|1) · s · (1− ωs)
or α ≥ α¯, with
α¯ =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ωg −E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)−E(r | 0)
When α < α¯ households are not willing to choose the public fund unless it signals it
invested in skill at the first stage. Both benevolent and self-interested fund manager can
signal it just by investing in promotion as private fund managers.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let us consider, first, the market without the public fund.
Remark that households do not opt out of the public scheme if and only if
(α · E(r|1) + (1− α) · E(r|0)) · s · (1− ω∗) ≥ E(r|1) · s · (1− ωs)
or α ≥ α˜, with
α˜ =
E(r | 1) · 1−ωs1−ω∗ − E(r | 0)
E(r | 1)−E(r | 0)
When α < α˜ households opt out. Now remark that, for any α the net revenue provided by
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the national agency for each unit of managed savings ((α·E(r|1)+(1−α)·E(r|0))·(1−ω∗))
is strictly higher than the one of the public fund competing in the market ((α · E(r|1) +
(1− α) · E(r|0)) · (1− ωg)).
Lemma 9 Under incomplete information and (1), and assuming that the national agency
is constrained by (4), the optimal payment function is such that: E(τi(r) | 1) > 0 and
E(τi(r) | 1) = C +E(τi(r) | 0,1−i), for all i ∈ I.
Proof. If E(τi(r) | 1) = 0, by constraint (4) it follows that τi(r) = 0 for all r ∈ Rn∗+ ,
then also E(τi(r) | 0,1−i) = 0, implying E(τi(r) | 1) < C + E(τi(r) | 0,1−i). Therefore,
E(τi(r) | 1) > 0. Let us consider the generic first order condition of the program (3) under
constraint (4)
−φ ·
∏
j∈I
f(rj |1) + εi ·
∏
j∈I
f(rj |1) + ηi · (f(ri|1)− f(ri|0)) ·
∏
j∈I/{i}
f(rj |1) + υi(r)− ψi(r) = 0
for any i ∈ I and any r ∈ Rn∗+ ; with εi ≥ 0, ηi ≥ 0, υi(r) ≥ 0, ψi(r) ≥ 0 the Lagrangian
multipliers of respectively the participation constraint, the incentive constraint, and con-
straints (4) and (5) in program (3). By E(τi(r) | 1) > 0, εi = 0, then summing first order
conditions over r and dividing the generic first order condition by
∏
j∈I f(rj |1)
ηi ·Big(1− f(ri|0)
f(ri|1)
)
= φ− υi(r) + ψi(r)
If ηi = 0 then υi(r) − ψi(r) = φ > 0 for all r ∈ Rn∗+ that is incompatible with incentive
constraint. Thus, ηi > 0, and the incentive constraint is binding.
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